perience, when the last rule can or should be broken. For example, an operations order (OPORD) issued in daylight, forward, and overlooking the terrain generally orients subordinates better than one issued only from a map in the TOC. The one-third, two-thirds rule may dictate that an order be given in the dark; a wise staff analyzes this and determines whether a recommendation should be made to adjust that time. The key is to give subordinates the best possible opportunity to understand their missions. With practice, a battalion TF often can issue a coherent OPORD in less than one-third of the allotted time.

The 3x5 cards described in FM 71 2 for staff status reports and estimates are useful tools. Each staff officer must know what he must receive as input from others and what he is expected to give them. Institutionalizing this within staff sections can pay great dividends. For example, the S-4 does not have to remain at the administrative/logistics center (ALC) to receive every last report before moving to the TOC; from the cards, his NCO knows the required critical data elements and can pass them to him enroute as soon as they come in. The S-1 and S-4 personnel in the ALC, by cross-training, can easily cover for each other. The key is not merely talking on the radio; it is quickly transmitting pre-formatted critical information.

The major time lines indicated by the vertical lines in the model are NTC-related, but they do not have to be. The far left time line marks the receipt of the WARNORD, which signifies a change in the mission or situation. If the WARNORD is clear enough, staff estimates can begin at that point

In no case should the estimating process be postponed beyond the receipt of the OPORD, represented by the second time line. The staff needs to know the mission, what, where, when, why, how (the highest commander's concept), proposed task organization and scheme of maneuver, and any priorities. Too often, until experience shows otherwise, a staff may decide to wait for the commander to tell them all those matters But this sort of waiting misuses time. There are many known factors in any situation that a staff can use to begin its estimates.

OUTLINE

Obviously, the TOC can also prepare an outline of the master overlay from which others will be reproduced, including marginal data. When the plan is completed, only the internal boundaries and other material need to be added.

The third time line, EOM, means End of Mission, but at the NTC, as in a real war, there is no formal EOM. Accordingly, this line represents the time at which a commander begins to focus his time and attention on the next mission. The next two lines represent a block of time for an after-action review (AAR), not unique to the NTC, but a regular event there. Its purpose here is to indicate a goal—the completion of the commander's estimate and decision. The formal preparation of the TF OPORD (reproduction, preparation of site to issue, and the like) is accomplished while the AAR is being conducted, with the goal of issuing the OPORD as quickly after the AAR as possible.

The staff and subordinate commanders now make certain that they understand exactly what is expected, and they wargame what they will do if the battle does not unfold exactly as envisioned. After all, there are no guarantees that the enemy will attack on schedule. The only sure thing is that things rarely go as planned.

Subordinates must understand the overall concept and the TF commander's intentions if the TF is to be successful. It has been proved again and again that small units, if they were well led and understood what was important, have saved much larger units in battle. It is also true that no order is beyond refinement after it is issued.

The aim of the model described in this article is to get the order issued consistently on time, as complete as possible, and as coherent as possible to ensure mission accomplishment. A good order, issued on time, is much better than a perfect order issued late.

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Bradley Platoon Organization

MAJOR CHESTER A. KOJRO

As I read the article "Bradley Infantry on the AirLand Battlefield" in the May-June 1986 issue of INFANTRY (pages 20-24), I was very disappointed. The many nice buzzwords and the references to previous articles in INFANTRY did not offset the fact that the article offered no new ideas about Bradley infantry organization.

The Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) does introduce a problem for positioning a unit's combat leaders. But we will never exploit the BFV's true potential until two basic facts are clearly understood:

- The mission of the infantry dismount

element in the BFV is the same one it had in the M113. It rides protected against small arms and indirect fire until the last covered position is reached, where it dismounts and fights on foot.

• The BFV is virtually a light tank that can also transport six infantrymen ready to fight independently of, in support of, or supported by the BFV. Conversely, the BFV can also fight supported by, in support of, or independently of the dismounted infantry element.

We do indeed have a potent combined arms team. But that team today is hampered by a single-arm (Infantry) chain of command that is ad hoc but not functionally organized. BFVs are fully capable of operating as light armor platoons, closing with and destroying the opponent through a combination of mobility, armor protected firepower, and shock action. Exploiting this capability, however, requires well trained, full-time, mounted warriors with a solid chain of command that is not fragmented once the passengers dismount.

The solution, therefore, is to split our mechanized infantry units along functional lines. There are various options, each with pros and cons, but all are superior to the current structure. The cornerstone of my favored plan is to "freeze" the BFV crews. The track commander (TC) would stay with the vehicle, while the leader of the dismount team stayed in back *with* his team. Here are several ways in which this could be accomplished.

The simplest way would be to organize the platoon into a light armor section (four BFVs), led by the platoon sergeant (PSG), and a dismounted section of three six-man squads and the platoon headquarters, led by the platoon leader (PL). The PL would ride as the TC of his BFV, which would be the only exception to the "freezing" of the crews.

The advantage of this option is that the fixed crews would be trained and proficient in mounted combat, while the fixed squads would have a consistent chain of command. The PL would have a true combined arms team under his control. The disadvantage is that the chain of command would still be fragmented with the PL and PSG acting independently instead of backing each other up. At platoon level, this would be acceptable, but the organization would be poorly suited for consolidation at company level.



Another option would be simply to split each platoon in two--a four-BFV platoon and an infantry platoon of three six-man squads. Each platoon would have its own headquarters element. The advantage here is excellent flexibility with plenty of leadership. The disadvantage is that the infantry platoon would be too small and would lack resilience once it incurred losses. The platoons would also be too rank-heavy. (Could we afford to double the number of PL and PSG slots?)

Both of the preceeding options stay within the current structure of four-BFV platoons and six-man squads while also retaining the three-platoon structure. But now let us consider a radical reorganization, befitting the radically different capabilities of the BFV (see chart).

Let's consider a company of two six-BFV platoons and two 34-man rifle platoons; each of the rifle platoons would have three nine-man squads and a seven-man headquarters. Each BFV platoon would lift an infantry platoon by taking the six fire teams (four or six men each) and then distributing the platoon headquarters across the remaining spaces in the vehicles.

When mounted, the company, in effect, would be a two-platoon light armor company. The BFV PLs would control the operation until the dismount was ordered, at which time the infantry platoons would emerge organizationally intact and able to fight supported by, in support of, or independently of the BFVs as ordered by the company commander, who would now have a balanced team with tremendous flexibility. He could pair his infantry and BFV platoons into combined teams, or he could create a potent light armor company and still have a two-platoon infantry company, either half of which could be commanded by either the company commander or the executive officer.

The advantages of this organization are tremendous. Although formed into four platoons, the company would not increase in size or manpower, except for new PL and PSG slots. The six-BFV platoon would be indistinguishable from a battalion scout platoon, a divisional cavalry platoon, or a BFV regimental cavalry pla-

toon. The BFV platoons would be capable of operating as either light armor platoons or as companies. The larger infantry platoons would be identical to conventional infantry platoons and just as powerful when dismounted.

POSSIBILITIES

The possibilities would be great. Conventional infantry units could then be quickly integrated into mechanized operations without reorganizing, an impossible feat with the present four-BFV platoon.

Once the infantry elements had dismounted, the BFVs could withdraw and pick up an additional platoon, shuttling it under armor too. Thus, not only would we have the tremendous potential of the fighting vehicle, but we would finally have an excellent "battlefield taxi," which we know is essential on the modern battlefield.

Disadvantages? I'm sure there are a few, but I can't think of any major ones. Triangular organizations are habitually nice, but I would hardly consider this balanced team to be a disadvantage. Control of the expanded BFV platoons would actually be simplified since the PL would be a mounted warrior all the time, instead of the "jack of all trades" he is now—sometimes a TC, other times a ground pounder, always changing his role and position. The infantry platoon would be stronger and more strongly led. The soldiers would no longer need to wonder where the PL or PSG might be. They would know. The PL and PSG would be with their platoons on the ground where they belong, leading.

The one issue begging, of course, is proponency. Would the BFV platoon be an Infantry organization or an Armor formation? Frankly, that's an issue for some high ranking people to decide. I don't care which they choose so long as they do choose and let us get on with the business of fielding an effective fighting force.

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Divide and Conquer

ROBERT E. ROGGE

Mass, firepower, and maneuver—these have been the basic tenets of war since the first cavemen threw rocks. These principles, manipulated by a knowledgeable and personally forceful commander using the right tactics, can win a battle—even against a superbly trained, disciplined, and equipped force commanded by an officer of demonstrated battlefield ruthlessness.

One such battle was fought on American soil some 200 years ago—the Battle of The Cowpens during the Revolutionary War. As a classic study in command and tactics, this battle deserves the attention of today's small unit commanders. It was fought on a purposefully selected site that offered no real avenue of escape. On one side was a mixture of infantry and cavalry composed of regulars and militiamen, all of whom were ill-fed, ill-clothed, and randomly armed. On the other was an intensely disciplined infantry and cavalry force, supported by field artillery—a force, moreover, that had come to believe in its own invincibility when facing such an inferior enemy.

Yet the rag-tag force defeated the better disciplined one. Why? Because its commander knew his own troops, knew what to expect of certain formations when the fighting came to close quarters, and knew the enemy's training and discipline and what they were founded upon. He also understood how to use maneuver to achieve a decisive victory. Using all this knowledge, he sited his troops to take advantage of their strengths and their weaknesses.

It is these facets of command—the use of firepower, maneuver, and mass—that are worthy of our consideration. Although the battle took only about an hour, it was a decisive victory for the American colonists, and so altered the enemy's strategic planning that his surrender at Yorktown came in less than a year.

The American Revolutionary War was primarily a land war, and battles were mostly fought in the European fashion by massed ranks of infantry volley-firing their muzzle-loading, smoothbore muskets at ranges of less than 200 yards. Since those muskets were notoriously inaccurate, a bayonet charge determined the battle. This charge, the classic example of mass as opposed to firepower and maneuver, was always the British Army's final tactic.

Highly trained and eminently skilled in such mass tactics, the British soldiers rarely lost a battle when they could come to grips with their enemy. But the American war was a new kind of war fought mostly in wooded terrain with few clear spaces large enough for forming up dense