soles). Extra socks should be carried and put on when they are needed. Blisters and abrasions are most commonly caused by moisture, improperly maintained or poorly fitted footwear, and heat caused by friction. A nylon or polypropylene sock liner can reduce the friction and act as a second skin.

During halts, feet should be elevated with the boot laces slightly loosened where they cross the arch to provide relief from swelling. If time permits, cool water can be used to relieve hot and irritated feet, powder can be applied, socks changed, and blisters treated when necessary. After a march, the feet can be cleaned and dried more carefully, boots cleaned, and blisters and abrasions treated.

## BLISTERS

If there are blisters, the feet should be carefully washed with soap and water. Care should be taken not to break the blisters. A sterile needle should then be used to prick the skin on the lower edge of the blister to empty the fluid. The skin over the blister should not be removed, as it is nature's best Band-aid, but some antibacterial ointment should be applied and the blister covered with a sterile pad or moleskin. (Blisters and abrasions on dirty, sweaty feet can lead to serious infections.)

Other serious foot problems that affect light infantry soldiers are stress fractures and injuries resulting from the repetitive pounding the feet receive during running, jogging, and marching. Many stress fractures can be prevented if the workload is increased gradually to strengthen the muscles, ligaments, and tendons that support the bones. Running on hard surfaces such as concrete and asphalt must be avoided as much as possible. Running shoes with cushioned soles can help absorb much of the shock.

The most important point for leaders to understand in the treatment of stress fractures is that the bone must be given time to rest and heal properly so it can stand physical stress again. The usual treatment is bone rest until the pain disappears, followed by a gradual return to activity. The following guidelines apply: two to three weeks of rest for a metatarsal (foot) stress fracture, at least six weeks for a tibial (shin) fracture, and eight weeks for a femoral (thigh) fracture. Studies have shown that soldiers who sustain fractures from training continue to be at high risk for recurrent stress fractures in subsequent training. In light of this, a gradual strength-building return to duty cannot be overemphasized.

The muscles and connective tissue also need attention. The best way to guard against injuries to muscles and tissue is to make sure the major muscle groups are stretched and warmed up before strenuous activity and stretched and cooled down after. These measures will increase the flexibility of the muscles and decrease the possibility of muscle strains, connective ligament and tendon sprains, cramps, or tightness. Stretching is most beneficial if a muscle is extended to its elastic limit and held there for a count. (See also "Physical Fitness Program" by Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Hoffman, INFANTRY, September-October 1986, pages 16-19.)

Some soldiers will be injured during training no matter how many precautions have been taken, because there are many variables over which the leaders and trainers have no control. These include the soldiers' varying levels of conditioning, dormant physical weaknesses, and accidents. But leaders and trainers can help prevent injuries by giving these matters their careful consideration. Fewer injuries lead, in turn, to higher morale and fewer training management problems. Leaders should recognize, though, that the injured soldiers are not defective in any way and should make every effort to return them to normal duty and to maintain their morale.

Light infantry leaders who approach the care of the feet as they would the maintenance of a mission-essential piece of equipment will succeed in reaching their objective. They must realize that morale, training benefits, and combat readiness in a light infantry unit are all dependent upon the individual soldiers and their feet.

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# Time Management Model

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN W. WILD

Time. There never seems to be enough of it. One of the problems any infantry leader faces is how to manage his time so that he can seize control of the battle. More, how does he teach it in his unit? How can a unit institutionalize its own time management?

To do both things, I use a time management model (see example). The goals of the model are these:

- To allow subordinates the greatest amount of time for their planning.




- To issue detailed warning orders.
- To develop doctrinally sound tentative plans.
- To initiate timely necessary movements.
- To conduct early reconnaissances to confirm tentative plans.
- To ensure proper staff coordination so that comprehensive and coherent plans are developed.
- To issue effective orders, making certain the commander's concept is well stated and understood.
- To complete preparations for and to execute the mission.

To some, this model may appear to be nothing more than a rewording of our prescribed troop leading procedure. But the key element in the model is consistency. Fatigue, friction, and the fog of war can have a harmful effect on the quality of the commander's efforts and those of his staff. Everything that can be placed in an SOP and thus institutionalized, therefore, is a plus for the entire unit. The model does just that; it lets each player see his role in accomplishing the unit's mission, how that role can change over time, and where the players interact with each other.

This model will work for most battalion task force (TF) missions anywhere, including the National Training Center (NTC). Using the model effectively requires a thorough knowledge of Chapter 2, Field Manual 71-2. In effect, the model puts Chapter 2 to work for the TF on one piece of paper.

The model reads from left to right, but it has no real start or end—it is designed for continuous operations. In the example, an operation in progress is shown by the time line "Current Mission." Certain bits of available information are shown by the broad arrow on the left. (The key sources of this information are identified, but there are others, of course.)

Upon receipt of a warning order (WARNORD) the staff planners and executive officer shift to double duty—while continuing to work on current operations, they also begin preparing for the next mission. Transmitting the WARNORD (and key elements of the OPORD to follow) to the battalion commander and S-3 alerts them. At this time, however, the actions taking place are primarily those of the staff planners under the direction of the executive officer (XO). The immediate questions that must be answered are: What has to be done? By whom? When? Where? What is our current capability to do that? (STATUS?) What do we expect our capability to be when the time comes to execute it? (STAFF ESTIMATES?) When does the order have to be given (one-third, two-thirds rule)?

The staff can usually determine, by ex-

perience, when the last rule can or should be broken. For example, an operations order (OPORD) issued in daylight, forward, and overlooking the terrain generally orients subordinates better than one issued only from a map in the TOC. The one-third, two-thirds rule may dictate that an order be given in the dark; a wise staff analyzes this and determines whether a recommendation should be made to adjust that time. The key is to give subordinates the best possible opportunity to understand their missions. With practice, a battalion TF often can issue a coherent OPORD in less than one-third of the allotted time.

The 3x5 cards described in FM 71 2 for staff status reports and estimates are useful tools. Each staff officer must know what he must receive as input from others and what he is expected to give them. Institutionalizing this within staff sections can pay great dividends. For example, the S-4 does not have to remain at the administrative/logistics center (ALC) to receive every last report before moving to the TOC; from the cards, his NCO knows the required critical data elements and can pass them to him enroute as soon as they come in. The S-1 and S-4 personnel in the ALC, by cross-training, can easily cover for each other. The key is not merely talking on the radio; it is quickly transmitting pre-formatted critical information.

The major time lines indicated by the vertical lines in the model are NTC-related, but they do not have to be. The far left time line marks the receipt of the WARNORD, which signifies a change in the mission or situation. If the WARNORD is clear enough, staff estimates can begin at that point

In no case should the estimating process be postponed beyond the receipt of the OPORD, represented by the second time line. The staff needs to know the mission, what, where, when, why, how (the highest commander's concept), proposed task organization and scheme of maneuver, and any priorities. Too often, until experience shows otherwise, a staff may decide to wait for the commander to tell them all those matters But this sort of waiting misuses time. There are many known factors in any situation that a staff can use to begin its estimates.

## OUTLINE

Obviously, the TOC can also prepare an outline of the master overlay from which others will be reproduced, including marginal data. When the plan is completed, only the internal boundaries and other material need to be added.

The third time line, EOM, means End of Mission, but at the NTC, as in a real war, there is no formal EOM. Accordingly, this line represents the time at which a commander begins to focus his time and attention on the next mission. The next two lines represent a block of time for an after-action review (AAR), not unique to the NTC, but a regular event there. Its purpose here is to indicate a goal—the completion of the commander's estimate and decision. The formal preparation of the TF OPORD (reproduction, preparation of site to issue, and the like) is accomplished while the AAR is being conducted, with the goal of issuing the OPORD as quickly after the AAR as possible.

The staff and subordinate commanders now make certain that they understand exactly what is expected, and they wargame what they will do if the battle does not unfold exactly as envisioned. After all, there are no guarantees that the enemy will attack on schedule. The only sure thing is that things rarely go as planned.

Subordinates must understand the overall concept and the TF commander's intentions if the TF is to be successful. It has been proved again and again that small units, if they were well led and understood what was important, have saved much larger units in battle. It is also true that no order is beyond refinement after it is issued.

The aim of the model described in this article is to get the order issued consistently on time, as complete as possible, and as coherent as possible to ensure mission accomplishment. A good order, issued on time, is much better than a perfect order issued late.

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# Bradley Platoon Organization

MAJOR CHESTER A. KOJRO

As I read the article "Bradley Infantry on the AirLand Battlefield" in the May-June 1986 issue of INFANTRY (pages 20-24), I was very disappointed. The many nice buzzwords and the references to previous articles in INFANTRY did not offset the fact that the article offered no new ideas about Bradley infantry organization.

The Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) does introduce a problem for positioning a unit's combat leaders. But we will never exploit the BFV's true potential until two basic facts are clearly understood:

- The mission of the infantry dismount